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Abstract
Excludable and congestible shared goods − club goods (e.g., internet access facilities) − are
more prevalent than Samuelsonian public goods. Our example shows that, unlike the usual
presumption with pure public goods, the optimal second−best supply of a club good might
exceed its first−best level. We argue that this arises because user charges can be levied on
club goods; the government need not impose distortionary taxes to finance them. Thus, the
first and second best in a club economy differ mainly because informational constraints
prevent the government achieving the right income distribution in the latter.
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A large literature compares the ￿rst-best (F-B) and second-best (S-B) supply of
a pure public good [e.g., Atkinson and Stern (1974), Wildasin (1984), King (1986),
Batina (1991), Wilson (1991a,b), Chang (2000)) and Gaube (2000)]. In the FB,
a planner allocates private and shared goods as it wishes, constrained only by the
economy￿ s overall resources. In the SB, s/he uses distortionary ￿nancing of the
shared good and household-speci￿c budget constraints operate. This literature is
still inconclusive but the presumption is of underprovision in the SB, both in the
good￿ s level and in that willingness to pay for a marginal unit supplied exceeds it
marginal cost1.
Buchanan (1965) club goods - e.g., swimming pools, internet services and tolled
trunk roads - are congestible and excludable, as are most shared goods. Does the
presumed relationship between FB and SB levels of a pure public good extends to
clubs? We show, via a simple example that can be generalised, that a club good
might well be overprovided in the SB if distributional considerations predominate
in the FB. This ￿nding is similar to Gaube￿ s (2000) for a pure public good, but for
di⁄erent reasons.
Unlike a pure public good, which is of unvarying quality irrespective of the
number of users, a club good varies in both the quantity and quality of provision
(e.g., a swimming pool￿ s size and average congestion level). So, to compare FB
and SB provision levels, we need a notion of quality-adjusted quantity. We ￿nesse
this problem here by studying cases where FB and constrained SB levels of quality
coincide, so comparison need be made only between the quantities of provision.
2. THE MODEL
We use the Fraser-Hollander model of SB clubs [cf.: Fraser and Hollander,
Cornes and Sandler (1996), Fraser (2000)]. In this model, which builds on the ap-
proach of, e.g., Brito and Oakland (1980) and Fraser (1996) for excludable public
goods, atomistic consumers confront a per visit price, facility size and conjectured
quality for a club good. Taking these as parametric, they self-select to club mem-
bership. In a resulting Nash equilibrium, their simultaneous actions determine the
club congestion, hence quality, which they face. In turn, an entrepreneurial club
good supplier uses the demand schedule generated by the consumers￿joint actions,
which it (correctly) anticipates, to ￿x the optimal price and level of facility provision
that ful￿ll its objectives.
Consider a single-club economy for simplicity.2 There are N consumers, all
with an identical utility function, U [:], de￿ned over the quantity, x, of a numeraire
private commodity, visits to or use of a club good, v, and its quality, q. The private
good is a necessity; the club good is not and need not be demanded at low incomes.
To make the analysis interesting, we study cases where individuals with su¢ ciently
low incomes will not choose the club good. We assume:
(A.1) U is strictly concave increasing in x, concave increasing in v and non-
decreasing in q.





density, dF(m) (we ignore integer problems). F (m) is known to the government
1See Gaube (2000) on this presumption.
2Even the most sophisticated comparisons of FB and SB provision of pure public goods that
allow for many private goods [e.g., Gaube (2000)] consider only one public good.
1or any other club supplier, but they cannot identify the income of anyone for tax
or price discrimination purposes.
(A.3) A club￿ s quality increases in its facility size, y, and decreases in aggregate
utilisation, V : @q(y;V )=@y ￿ q1 (y;V ) > 0; @q(y;V )=@V ￿ q2 (y;V ) < 0
(A.4) q (:) is homogeneous of degree zero in y and V : q(y;V ) ￿ q (y=V );q0 > 0:
NB: (i) with exogenous income, there are no incentive e⁄ects to providing and
￿nancing the club good; (ii) facility size is measured by the expenditure on the
club: a unit of money buys a unit of ￿ facility.￿ (iii) If q is of the form (A.4),
quality depends solely on the facility provision per use of the club. Only with
this form will the FB ￿ toll,￿ if levied, make the club break even, whatever the
population size [Kolm (1974); Mohring and Harwitz (1962)]. Here, the FB ￿ toll￿
is club users￿identical marginal willingness to pay for a marginal visit by foregoing
private consumption and equals the value of the quality degradation the marginal
visit imposes on club users.
Finally, we restrict attention to perhaps the simplest of the the families of utility
functions for which optimal quality provision in the club is independent of the
income distribution if (A.4) holds [Fraser (2000, 2005)]:
(A.5) All consumers have utility function (a) U(x;v;q) ￿ u(x;vq).
Our results extend to other utilities for which optimal quality provision is inde-
pendent of the the income distribution.
The First Best
In the FB, the government has full information about consumers￿incomes. It
can pool resources to get any allocation of goods, hence welfare, it thinks ￿t, subject
to the economy￿ s overall endowment. As all have the same U, it equalises utilities
at the (x;v) bundle that maximises utility with all treated equally.
Let facility provision per use of the club be p - i.e., p ￿ y=V . By (A.4), q =
q(p). Adopt the normalisation q(0) = 0. Let m denote mean income and suppose
(A.5)(a). The FB problem is:
Max
p;v :u[m ￿ pv;vq(p)] (1)
Using (*) to indicate the FB, the two ￿rst-order conditions (FOC) characterising
it are:
f￿u1 [m ￿ p￿v￿;v￿q(p￿)]p￿ + u2 [m ￿ p￿v￿;v￿q(p￿)]q (p￿) ￿ 0;v￿ ￿ 0g (2)
f￿u1 [m ￿ p￿v￿;v￿q(p￿)] + u2 [m ￿ p￿v￿;v￿q(p￿)]q0 (p￿) ￿ 0;p￿ ￿ 0g (3)
At an interior solution, the FOCs reduce to
p￿q0(p￿) = q (p￿) (4)
This identi￿es the unique p￿ with (A.5)(a). It is also the unique p￿ for which the
quality provision per unit of expenditure is maximised [Fraser (2000)]. Note also
from (2) that, if v￿ = 0,
￿u1(m;0)p￿ + u2(m;0)q(p￿) ￿ 0 (5)
If the club good is normal, when (5) holds with equality it identi￿es a unique mean
income, m￿ say, below which v￿ = 0 and above which v￿ > 0. The FB level of
facility provision is then
y￿ = Np￿v￿ (6)
2The Second Best
Now, the government does not know each household￿ s income and cannot redis-
tribute. It can only ￿x the club￿ s quality and, using the revenues from a break-even
toll on it when consumers self-select, the overall provision. Non-excludability and
the preference revelation problem means the government cannot charge directly for
a pure public good in the SB. Rather, it must be ￿nanced by distortionary tax(es)
on other goods. A club good￿ s excludability means it can be charged for directly,
mitigating both free riding and the need for distortionary taxes.3. Thus, the SB
nature of the government￿ s problem in supplying a club good lies mainly in that
it cannot levy unrestricted lump sum taxes and thereby get the ￿ right￿ income
distribution. If everyone is identical and there are no distributional concerns, the
FB and SB coincide in our club model, unlike with a pure public good.
Suppose now the government announces a toll p to ￿nance the quality provision
per visit. We can show [Fraser (2000)] that, given (A.4) and (A.5)(a), it will choose
the FB p, p￿, in the SB.4 A household with income m will then choose its club use
to maximise utility, u[m ￿ p￿v;vq (p￿)]; with the resulting FOC (with ￿￿ indicating
SB magnitudes)5
f￿u1 [m ￿ p￿v￿￿;v￿￿q(p￿)]p￿ + u2 [m ￿ p￿v￿￿;v￿￿q(p￿)]q (p￿) ￿ 0;v￿￿ ￿ 0g (7)
Notice from (7) that the consumer with income m will not buy the club good if
￿u1(m;0)p￿ + u2(m;0)q(p￿) ￿ 0 (8)
Clearly, from (5) and (8) holding with equality, the m which leaves a consumer
indi⁄erent between making visits and not in the SB is the mean income which
leaves the government indi⁄erent between providing the club good and not in the
FB. I.e., denoting the m which solves (9) with equality by m￿￿, m￿￿ = m￿. So,
were everyone identical, thus all had mean income m = m, each would choose the
FB level of club use, v￿, in the SB and we would have y￿ = y￿￿.
With non-identical individuals, this suggests why we might expect y￿ < y￿￿.
Even if m ￿ m￿ = m￿￿, thus y￿ = 0, we will have y￿￿ > 0 if some consumers have
m > m￿￿: Of course, the comparison is only non-trivial if m > m￿￿ - i.e., if mean
income is high enough for the government to wish to supply the club good. We
assume this from hereon.




, all with income m > m￿￿ use
the club and those with m < m￿￿ do not. Invert the ￿rst part of (7) as an equality
to get club users￿optimal usage, v￿￿(m;p￿): The break-even SB level of club facility





3As the club is modelled as a luxury good, the government will not impose distortionary taxes
on private goods to ￿nance it.
4Our SB is a ￿constrained￿SB as the government just raises as much from supplying the club
good as it spends on it. It might do better than this if it were to ￿tax￿the club good by charging
for it more than it spends per visit and used the surplus to ￿nance an identical cash transfer to
everyone. But, then, the FB and SB q0s would not coincide, in general. We would then be forced
to make a comparison of quantities and qualities in comparing the FB and the SB. Our initial
tries at this have been inconclusive.
5An household will choose the v￿￿ which maximises its utility and then choose to be a club user
if, at that v￿￿, it obtains utility at least as great as from spending all its income on the private
good. If utility is of di⁄erent form from those in (A.5), an household might get utility which is
less than that from consuming x alone at a v > 0 which satis￿es the ￿rst part of (7) with equality.
See Fraser and Hollander (2001).
33. AN EXAMPLE
To compare y￿ given by (6) with y￿￿ given by (9), we specialise u(:) and F fur-
ther. Suppose u(:) takes the following form (the linear expenditure system allowing
for zero club consumption):
(A.6) u(x;vq) = (x ￿ x)
(1￿￿) (vq + ")
￿, for scalars x, " > 0, 1 > ￿ > 0, x < M.
Suppose also that the population distribution function is Pareto with M = 1:
(A.7) F(m) =
￿
0; m < M
1 ￿ (M=m)
￿ ; m ￿ M
In (A.7), ￿ > 0 is a parameter; ￿ > 2 is needed for the variance of income to be
well-de￿ned. Mean income is m = ￿M=(￿ ￿ 1); thus ￿ > 1 is needed for m to be
well-de￿ned.6
At an interior solution, each consumer￿ s optimal club usage in the FB is
v￿ =
￿

























where v￿ ￿ 0 requires




To make the problem interesting, assume that a strict inequality holds in (11).
Then, in the FB,
y￿ = Np￿v￿ =
￿N
￿ ￿ 1
[￿M ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)m￿] (12)









p￿ (m ￿ m￿) (13)




￿ (m ￿ m￿)￿M
￿m￿(1+￿)dm = N￿M
￿m￿(1￿￿)=(￿ ￿ 1) (14)
Hence














￿ ￿ m￿￿ + ￿m￿(￿￿1) (m￿ ￿ M)
i
(15)
To sign y￿￿ ￿ y￿, we use the following theorem (proof available on request).
Theorem 1. ￿ > (1 ￿ z￿)=(1 ￿ z) if ￿ > 1;1 > z > 0:
Theorem 1 and (15) now enable us to prove our central result.
Theorem 2. If u(x;vq) = (x ￿ x)
(1￿￿) (vq + ")
￿ and F(m) is Pareto ((A.7)),
then y￿￿ > y￿:
6See Degroot (1971) and Lambert (1993) on properties of the Pareto distribution.
























￿ (1 ￿ z￿)=(1 ￿ z)
(16)
letting z ￿ M=m￿ < 1: For integer ￿, (1 ￿ z￿)=(1 ￿ z) is the sum to ￿￿1 terms of
a geometric series with ￿rst term 1 and common ratio of successive terms of z < 1.
It is then easy to show that ￿ > (1 ￿ z￿)=(1 ￿ z) for integer ￿ ￿ 2. For other ￿
values, we use Theorem 1. As ￿ > 2 is needed for both the mean and variance of
income to exist, (16) and Theorem 1 imply y￿￿ > y￿:
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our example provides a simple illustration of the fact that club goods might
not be underprovided in an SB. Clubs can be charged for directly; they need not
be ￿nanced by distortionary taxes. Thus, the FB and SB di⁄er in a club economy
mainly because the government cannot get the correct income distribution in the
SB due to imperfect information. In the SB, incomes di⁄er and the relatively rich
are more likely to buy the club good. The government ￿xes the size of the club
facility to satisfy demand at the SB toll and quality. ￿ Overprovision￿can result
from the need to meet the high club demand by the rich. Unlike a pure public
good, the government cannot use the club good as a redistributive device as it
cannot price discriminate (by assumption), not everyone uses it and those that do
buy di⁄erent amounts. So, while our explanation for overprovision in the club SB
hinges on distributional considerations as does Gaube￿ s for pure public goods, our
mechanisms are di⁄erent.
Our ￿ndings derive from a model in which FB and SB club ￿ tolls￿and qualities
coincide; we only needed to compare the two facility sizes. Away from these circum-
stances, the government can still ￿nance the club good by user charges rather than
distortionary taxes if it wishes. FB and SB ￿ tolls￿ , qualities and facility sizes will
then di⁄er in general, but these di⁄erences will again primarily re￿ ect distributional
considerations [Fraser and Hollander (2001)].
Our results complement Scotchmer￿ s (1985) and Manzini and Mariotti￿ s (M&M,
2002). They also ￿nd ￿ excesses￿in aspects of club good supply. Scotchmer shows
that the equilibrium number of ￿rms that enter a market to supply a club facility
exceeds the e¢ cient number - there are too many clubs. M&M study of a three-
consumer non-cooperative game of club formation ￿nds a ￿ tragedy of clubs￿ : the
excess entry of members into a single club. Both these analyses consider identical
consumers (with M&M￿ s consumers having market power). We consider atomistic,
heterogeneous, price- and quality-taking ones. Unlike M&M￿ s club, our club has
too few members - it is the provision for them that is socially excessive.
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